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This paper provides a sustained introduction for the use of dynamic panel methods when 
analysing life satisfaction. As well as being able to address the issue of serial correlation, 
dynamic  panel  analysis  also  has  the  advantage  of  being  able  to  treat  variables  as 
exogenous  or  endogenous,  important  for  happiness,  and  can  generate  both 
contemporaneous and long run estimates for independent variables. A key result found 
initially for young people, but which is robust to different age ranges and countries, is 
that happiness is largely contemporaneous although there is a small, persistent effect of 
the past on current happiness. Additionally, decision rules are provided for the analysis of 
happiness using dynamic panel analysis.  
1
 Address for correspondence: alan.piper@uni-flensburg.de
2
 I am enormously grateful to Nick Adnett, Andrew Clark, and Geoff Pugh for thorough, useful, 
and highly beneficial comments, suggestions and discussions. This paper is far better than it would have 
been without their input. The usual disclaimer applies.
Dynamic Analysis and the Economics of Happiness: Rationale, Results and Rules
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to introduce a new method to the economic analysis of the 
concept of happiness. The ‘workhorse’ model within this field is fixed effects analysis 
taking advantage of the rich nature of nationally representative samples, like the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Such 
an analysis has provided many insights for a scientific understanding of well-being. 
Useful reviews of these studies include Clark et al. 2008 and MacKerron (2012). Using a 
subset of the BHPS, initially, this study demonstrates that many of these studies, by using 
fixed effects analysis, are potentially misspecified. The presence or otherwise of serial 
correlation is not tested for in the literature, and the analysis here, using a well-known 
and well-utilised data set demonstrate that it is a substantial issue. The presence of serial 
correlation in the idiosyncratic error term means that there are omitted dynamics in the 
FE estimates. As King and Roberts (2012) forcefully argue, this should not be treated as a 
problem to be fixed by adjusting the standard error but instead treated as an opportunity 
to take advantage of this information and respecify the model. 
The respecification here, which results from the strongly significant finding of serial 
correlation in the idiosyncratic error term, is to employ dynamic panel methods. This 
introduces a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand-side of the equation, and 
substantially changes the interpretation of the coefficients for the independent variables. 
Such an analysis also introduces more methodological considerations, including the 
ability to choose whether the independent variables are endogenous and exogenous. As 
we shall see, such a choice can substantially change the outcome of the results for well-
being estimates. As the main focus of this paper is about introducing and discussing 
dynamic panel methods and well-being, the bulk of the work below is given over to 
explanations and consideratons associated with the use of the method and the 
interpretation of the results. The twenties age range focus can be mainly seen as the frame 
that the analysis hangs on. That said the results are robust to other age ranges, and 
datasets too. What is described here appears somewhat more universal than for British 
individuals in their 20s.3
The analysis for the twenties, using standard controls, (marital status, job status, income, 
health, education) is in line with the U-shape found in many studies over the whole 
lifecycle (Clark and Oswald (1994), Blanchflower (2001), Di Tella et al. (2003), 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) are just four of many examples). Happiness appears to 
decline over the twenties age range. A novel result that stems directly from the use of 
dynamic methods is that happiness is largely contemporary: the influence of the past on 
contemporaneous well-being is approximately ten percent. This is robust for other age 
ranges, the whole life-cycle, other countries, and alternative ways of measuring 
wellbeing. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief rationale for an 
investigation into part of the lifecycle generally, and the twenties generally, the main 
basis of this research. Due to a lack of previous economic analysis in this area, some 
relevant psychological literature is also reviewed.4 Section 3 presents the static panel 
analysis regarding the happiness of young people (defined here as individuals in their 
3
 This twenties age range focus reflects the initial focus of the research, which was somewhat 
overtaken by the interesting methodological considerations and outcomes discussed here.
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 In psychology this period is known variously as late adolescence, emerging adulthood or early 
adulthood.
twenties) and provides the rationale for the dynamic panel analysis, the results of which 
are found in section 4. Section 4 also discusses the issues surrounding a dynamic analysis 
of wellbeing, and demonstrates that the central result is robust to other age ranges, data 
sets and countries. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
2. Age and Well-Being
“Despite all the recent research regarding happiness and subjective well-being a 
fundamental research question remains poorly understood. What is the relationship 
between well-being and age?”
Blanchflower and Oswald (2008 p.1733)
This section reviews and discusses some of the issues regarding an economic assessment 
of age and well-being, and offers reasons why it is potentially valuable to investigate 
different age groups separately. This section also provides a rationale for investigating the 
twenties part of the lifecycle, the initial focus of the empirical work. Relevant literature, 
from both economics and psychology, is discussed. This reliance on psychology will be 
particularly important when discussing young people, given the nature of the studies over 
the lifespan and its different parts. 
Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) investigate what they call the ceteris paribus 
relationship between age and well-being, factoring out many other considerations to get 
to an underlying pattern. This approach is taken to achieve an idea of the relationship 
between age and well-being not considering the many different elements that are 
important at different life stages: “the paper’s concern is with the ceteris paribus 
correlation between well-being and age. Hence we later partial out some other 
confounding factors, such as income and marital-status, that alter over a typical person’s 
lifetime and have an effect upon well-being” (p.3). Their results suggest a U-shape 
relationship between life satisfaction and age, with the conditional regressions finding 
reported well-being being higher at both the start and at the end of the adult lifespan.
Most studies in economics using the ‘many controls’ regressions of Blanchflower and 
Oswald (2008) find a similar U-shape. This U-shape has proved quite robust, being found 
in Clark and Oswald (1994), with Blanchflower (2001) demonstrating this shape in 23 East 
European transition nations and Di Tella et al. (2003) getting the same result for 12 Western 
industrial nations. The study mentioned above by Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) 
replicates the U-shape in 72 countries, when income and demographic variables are held 
constant. 
A potential problem with multivariate regressions that find a U-shape (by controlling for 
many other factors) is that the controls assume the same definitions and standards for 
everyone, aged twenty, fifty, or eighty. Good health, for example, is assumed to have the 
same meaning for everyone regardless of age; yet an 80 year old may have a different 
conception of good health than a twenty year old. The multivariate regressions will not 
pick this up, and this is the specific reason for Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) not 
including physical health as a control. Clark (2007) explains similarly: “in the context of 
well-being and age… it is contentious to include health as a right hand side variable, 
although this practice is widespread in the literature. Including health does imply that we 
are comparing individuals of different (working) ages, but with the same level of health.” 
(p. 11). As health in these studies is often self-reported (as excellent, good etc.) the 
multivariate regressions are, controlling for an individual’s appreciation (or otherwise) of 
their health, which is perhaps less contentious, because we are asking how an individual’s 
belief about their own health contributes to an estimation of their own life satisfaction. 
Objective health may be different but a subjective satisfaction with health is what is 
asked about and the assumption is that this satisfaction has the same impact on happiness. 
What the individual considers to be excellent health at 80 is highly likely to be different 
to excellent health at 20 but the contribution to subjective well-being is held (controlled) 
as the same. If differences in health matter for well-being, and the stylised result in the 
happiness literature is that health matters greatly, how should we account for it in an 
investigation of the underlying relationship between age and well-being? One solution 
would be to look at smaller age ranges and piece the results together. Another solution 
would be to use interaction terms to capture any differing effect of heath over the 
lifecycle. A further comment in the literature on health and education is that including 
them as controls could possibly bias the coefficient on income downwards “since you 
will not be capturing its impact through health and education” (Bottan and Perez-Truglia 
2010, p.6), however they also state that “controlling for as many covariates as possible is 
our strategy to minimise the potential biases” (Bottan and Perez-Truglia, 2010, p.6).5 
However, such a strategy will not capture indirect effects, i.e. those mediated by other 
variables. The twenties age range, the original focus here, is obviously more homogenous 
than the whole adult lifespan6, and the conditionality placed on the age and well-being 
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relationship means that the concerns about the health controls are thus mitigated 
somewhat. In our analyses below it is therefore less contentious to include health as a 
right-hand side variable. 
Thinking about the left hand-side of the standard equations (i.e. happiness) also provides 
a rationale for a focus on a particular part of the lifecycle. In short, is the left hand side 
variable the same for everyone in the sample? Some studies assume that it is (Layard 
2005; Myers and Diener 1995), whereas some studies argue that it is highly subjective 
and so different for everyone (Gilbert 2005). However, perhaps there is a systematic way 
that happiness differs between ages meaning that it is useful to study isolated parts of the 
lifecycle? There is some evidence that this is so. For example, Kamvar et al. (2009) in an 
analysis of twelve million blogs find that younger people (the paper is not precise about 
what this means) refer to happiness as excitement whereas older people refer to it as 
feeling peaceful. In the blogs being happy was associated with high arousal words for 
young people, whereas the association was with low arousal words for older people 
(again, there is no clear definition of older people). They offer support for this finding in 
three experiments which demonstrate the same thing (or similar) in different ways. These 
experiments demonstrate a statistically significant difference between the two age groups, 
though a weakness is that some of the experiments are based on a very small sample size. 
They argue that this change in how happiness is viewed is driven by an increasing sense 
of connectedness (to others and the present moment). The difference in what happiness 
(and therefore self-reported happiness) means to different age groups is potentially 
important. 
Recall the discussion of the changing meaning of happiness over the lifecycle in section 3
An update of the analysis in Kamvar et al. (2009) demonstrates the relative importance of 
excitement and peacefulness with respect to what individuals’ regard as happiness in 
different age ranges (Mogliner et al. 2011). For the twenties age range the ratio of excited 
happiness to peaceful happiness is about 1.5 to 1, and, as seen on the table below, the 
change throughout the lifecycle is striking. Note well that the first line of the table and 
figures are as presented in the original study, whereas the second line is a slight rebasing 
of the figures for easier comparison.
Table 1 Ratio of happiness as excitement to happiness as peacefulness across the lifecycle
Teens 20s 30s 40s 50s
Excited 
happiness/ 
peaceful 
happiness
1.85:1
1: 0.54
1.48:1
1: 0.68
1:1.19
1:1.19
1:3.42
1:3.42
1:8.00
1:8.00
(Source: Mogliner et al., 2011, table 3)
The discussion now turns to the literature, again from within economics and psychology, 
which investigates the happiness of young people specifically. Psychologists have studied 
this particular age range in more detail. Some have suggested that fundamental changes 
occur over the twenties age range. Bee(1997), for example recognises that in this age 
range personality changes towards more autonomy, and more striving for achievement as 
well as increased self-confidence and personal assertiveness. She also notes that 
individuals in this age range become physically independent of their family, but more 
psychologically independent too. This personality shift is clearly one that is not limited to 
one particular cohort, and lends itself to a lifecycle interpretation of changes in happiness 
over the twenties. Similarly, according to Loevinger (1976, 1984), who set out a 
framework in psychology for measuring non-observables like the quality of life in 1957, 
the underlying change in early adulthood is a shift from an external to an internal 
definition of oneself. Demographer Ronald Rindfuss (1991) refers to the years between 
20 and 30 as ‘demographically dense’, because of the many events that take place in this 
period. A focus in psychology is made on the ‘transition to adulthood’ is in line with a 
‘lifecycle’ approach: i.e. the changes are due to getting older. This transition argument 
suggests that over the twenties – “years of profound change and importance” (Arnett, 
2000) – what is important for subjective well-being may change.
Thus, the above discussion demonstrates why happiness or life satisfaction may change 
over the twenties age range (with potential reasons) and emphasises again that the age 
range is worth assessing separately from other age ranges. The brief review of research 
from psychology, it appears that different periods of the lifecycle (and different cohorts) 
require separate studies to properly understand the causes and correlates of happiness in 
these different age ranges. This is similar to the argument made by Buss, the evolutionary 
psychologist who has undertaken investigations into happiness, who argues that sources 
of happiness differ profoundly for individuals of different ages (Buss, 2000). Carstensen’s 
theory, (cited in Blanchflower and Oswald 2008), argues that ageing is associated with 
increasing motivation to derive emotional meaning from life and decreasing motivation 
to expand one's horizons. In short, as one ages one feels more connection to the present 
moment. Again, within psychology, the field of gerontology is clearly predicated on an 
explicit recognition that at different ages, different things are important for well-being 
and the quality of life and, as this quote from a survey of gerontology argues, “it is not 
appropriate to measure well-being in old age by the same standards that apply to middle 
age, namely, standards based upon activity or social involvement” (Neugarten et al 1964, 
p.134). Recent work has started to explore this notion that, for different age groups, 
happiness might mean, and be derived from, different things. Lelkes (2008) uses evidence of 
the U-shape as a start, via European Social Survey (cross-section data), to argue that changes 
for older people are explained, partly, by changing preferences and, partly, by changing 
circumstances.
Within economics, only one study (to my knowledge) has specifically investigated the 
well-being of younger individuals. Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) assess the well-
being of the young (meaning individuals under 30) in the United States, and in many 
European countries, via data from the U.S. General Social Surveys and the 
Eurobarometer for approximately twenty years from the early 1970s. Using ordered logit 
analysis, they find that the probability of reporting a high happiness score is lowest at the 
end of one’s twenties, which may be initially taken as suggestive of a ‘lifecycle’ result. 
However, since both the U.S. General Social Surveys and the Eurobarometer are cross-
section data, the result could just as easily be a cohort result. This apparent declining 
happiness over the twenties period is consistent with the U-shape, a result examined here 
with more recent British data in section 3. They also find a statistically significant, 
positive time trend, suggesting that ‘young Americans become steadily happier since the 
1970s’ (p.7). For comparison, a time trend effect for the over 30s was found to be small 
and negative. For Europe, Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) find a slightly upward trend 
in young people reporting increased happiness over roughly the same period. Though the 
abstract acknowledges that “many commentators believe that life in the industrial nations 
is getting tougher for the young… [and that] the evidence in this paper paints a different 
picture. The paper documents a rising level of happiness among young people in western 
countries” (p.289), these results are not necessarily in contrast to the claims made 
regarding a ‘quarter-life crisis’. This is in part because the years of the data used (1972-
93) do not reflect the main period of concern for the advocates of this phenomenon. Also 
as noted above the data sets used are not panels, so the same individuals are not being 
followed over time and that therefore the results could be due to different people being 
interviewed each year. This also restricts the econometric methods available to 
investigate the data. In Europe they generally find for individuals under 30 a statistically 
significant upward time trend in 13 out of 15 countries. However, the two countries 
where it is not found are Great Britain and Ireland, and Blanchflower and Oswald 
comment that “why the British Isles misses out on this recent growth of well-being 
amongst the young is a puzzle” (2000, p.302).  Thus they cannot reject the belief that life 
‘is getting tougher for the young’ in the UK, home of the individuals investigated here. 
The next sections make use of panel data to empirically examine the happiness of individuals 
in the twenties age range in Britain via multivariate regressions on this shorter life span. As 
noted earlier this removes some of the methodological concerns discussed above, and 
enables a better picture of the happiness of young people to emerge, as compared to 
studies of the whole life span, where happiness has variable and often different meanings 
for the individuals’ investigated.
3 Happiness in the twenties: panel analysis
The benefits of panel analysis as compared to pooled cross section analysis are numerous. 
Arguably the most important benefit is that individual heterogeneity can be controlled 
for, and this helps us overcome Bentham’s well-known apples and oranges concern. This 
is particularly so for fixed effects estimations, where the comparison is ‘within’ a person, 
which removes the need to compare between individuals. This estimation method 
effectively ‘controls’ for the time invariant characteristics of each individual, meaning 
that FE regressions allow (or control) for differences in personality and disposition that 
may be important determinants of life satisfaction. The choice of estimating method is 
discussed further below, and the subsequent analysis follows the approach, initially, of 
much published literature (some of which are discussed above). The variables included in 
the regression are those suggested by the ‘economics of happiness’ literature which, in 
turn, provide the framework for the investigation. These variables are discussed below. 
The data come from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), with the dependent 
variable being life satisfaction, measured on an ordinal scale from 1 to 7, ‘not at all 
satisfied’ to ‘completely satisfied’. The independent variables are income, job status, 
marital status, education, and health, wave and regional dummies are also included. The 
other variables in the regression account for the region, the year (wave dummy variables) 
and age bands.
Combined, these are the variables that make up the happiness functions that are estimated 
in sections 3 and 4. The next few paragraphs briefly summarise the reasons advanced by 
orthodox economic theory for the inclusion of these variables in happiness functions. The 
specification adopted here is typical of the estimations in the empirical economic 
literature referred to throughout the thesis. There are anticipated results that reflect both 
orthodox economic theory and other empirical work. Work on well-being is continuing in 
each of these areas and, as yet, there are no stylised ‘facts’, particularly because of issues 
related to endogeneity and causality.
Initial diagnostic tests (not reported here) establish that the workhorse model, FE, is the 
preferred static model, being more appropriate than RE and OLS. Results for these 
regressions are presented in table 2: the different FE estimations in the table contain wave 
and period dummies (columns 2 and 4) and robust standard errors to correct for 
heteroscedascticity (columns 3 and 4). A discussion of these results follows the table.
Table 2 Fixed effects life satisfaction regressions for individuals in their 20s
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
FE FE FE FE
Robust SE Robust SE
VARIABLES
Life 
Satisfactio
n
Life 
Satisfaction
Life 
Satisfactio
n
Life 
Satisfaction
Income 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Self-employed -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049)
Unemployed -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.31***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.047) (0.047)
Retired -0.32 -0.28 -0.32*** -0.28***
(1.004) (1.004) (0.074) (0.079)
Other Labour Force 
Status 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029)
Married 0.06* 0.07** 0.06** 0.07**
(0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032)
Separated -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
(0.086) (0.087) (0.116) (0.117)
Divorced 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07
(0.099) (0.100) (0.144) (0.146)
Widowed -0.48 -0.49 -0.48 -0.49
(0.511) (0.512) (0.992) (0.985)
Education: High -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03
(0.086) (0.087) (0.099) (0.101)
Education: Medium -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
(0.087) (0.088) (0.099) (0.100)
Health: Excellent 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.44***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029)
Health: Good 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
age2324 -0.06*** -0.04 -0.06*** -0.04
(0.022) (0.029) (0.023) (0.030)
age2526 -0.07*** -0.00 -0.07** -0.00
(0.025) (0.044) (0.027) (0.045)
age2729 -0.11*** -0.01 -0.11*** -0.01
(0.028) (0.063) (0.031) (0.064)
Wave Dummies No Yes No Yes
Region Dummies No Yes No Yes
Constant 4.95*** 4.97*** 4.95*** 4.97***
(0.078) (0.112) (0.089) (0.119)
Observations 22,967 22,695 22,967 22,695
Number of pid 7,312 7,284 7,312 7,284
Adjusted R-squared -0.430 -0.432 0.026 0.028
Standard errors in 
parentheses
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; 
* p<0.1
The results indicate that the following are positive and significant for life satisfaction: 
income (which is in thousands of pounds and deflated by the CPI); being married; and 
categorising health as good or excellent. Being unemployed is statistically significant and 
negative  As can be seen, altering the estimation to include wave and regional dummies, 
and using robust standard errors does not qualitatively change these results by much. The 
main difference is that the few individuals who are retired are significantly less happy, on 
average, than those employed: a result perhaps consistent with the non-pecuniary 
arguments for the loss of happiness due to unemployment (the size of the coefficient is 
similar to that for the unemployed). When the wave and region dummies are included, the 
dummies for the age categories are insignificant, but when they are not included the age 
dummies are statistically significant and negative (when compared to being in the 20 to 
22 age range category). Further checks demonstrate, perhaps unsurprisingly, that it is the 
wave dummies responsible for the loss of significance of the age dummies. Thus the 
results for age dummies may be picking up wave effects. Despite this possibility, it is 
interesting to ask whether a focus on the twenties age range can offer support for the U-
shape found via age and age-squared over the whole lifecycle. Over the twenties does 
ceteris paribus life satisfaction fall, ceteris paribus? The age dummies in table 2 (where 
significant, i.e. in columns 1 and 3, the estimates without the time and regional dummies) 
give a larger negative coefficient for the older age range: -.0.06 for 23 to 24 year olds, 
-0.07 for 25 an 26 year olds, and - 0.11 for 27 to 29 year olds, in comparison to the base 
age category of 20 to 22 years old.  A separate regression was run with individual age 
dummies and figure 3 shows that life satisfaction declines, on average, over this age 
range. The vertical axis represents the coefficient on the age dummy, with age being on 
the horizontal axis. All of the coefficients were significant. (The estimates are the 
equivalent of column 1.)
Figure 3 Coefficients on age, in a life satisfaction regression.
Wooldridge’s (2002) test for serial correlation, implemented in Stata by the user-written 
xtserial command (Drukker 2003), rejects the null of no first order autocorrelation. This 
is potentially useful information. One possibility is to recognise the clusters involved in 
the panel regression and to correct the standard errors accordingly. However this treats 
the omitted dynamics detected by the diagnostic test as a problem rather than an 
invitation to respecify the model to include the omitted dynamics in the estimated part of 
the model and thus to exploit this additional information in estimation. This argument has 
recently been strongly supported by King and Roberts (2012) in a study of robust 
standard errors: 
Robust standard errors now seem to be viewed as a way to inoculate oneself from 
criticism. We show, to the contrary, that their presence is a bright red flag, 
meaning “my model is misspecified”… it appears to be the case that a very large 
fraction of the articles published across fields is based on misspecified models. 
For every one of these articles, at least some quantity that could be estimated is 
biased (p. 2).7
Accordingly, a potentially more interesting solution is to estimate a dynamic panel model 
(which is undertaken in section 4). The outcome of this is interesting, and provides new 
insights for the empirical literature on the economics of happiness.
4 Happiness in the twenties: dynamic panel analysis
This section is informed by finding the presence of first order serial correlation in the 
idiosyncratic error term in the static estimations of section 3. Such a result can mean that 
the estimates generated by static panel analysis are inefficient and potentially 
misspecified. Adding dynamics to the model is usually undertaken by including a lag of 
the dependent variable as a right hand side variable. Hence we are estimating the 
following standard equation (with the independent variables excluded for clarity):
                            (1).                                                                              )(1, ititiit yy εαβ ++= −
As it is a panel model each observation is indexed over i (= 1…N) cross-section groups 
(here individuals) and t (= 1…T) time periods (here, annual observations). Equation 1 is a 
first-order dynamic panel model, because the explanatory variables on the right-hand side 
7
 “We strongly echo what the best data analysts have been saying for decades: use all the standard 
diagnostic tests; be sure that your model actually fits the data; seek out as many observable implications as 
you can observe from your model. And use all these diagnostic evaluation procedures to respecify your 
model” King and Roberts (2012, p.8).
include the first lag of the dependent variable (yi, t-1). The composed error term in 
parentheses combines a group-specific random effect to control for all unobservable 
effects on the dependent variable that are unique to the individual and do not vary over 
time (αi), which captures specific ignorance about individual i, and an error that varies 
over both individuals and time ( itε ), which captures our general ignorance of the 
determinates of yit. However, this cannot be estimated accurately by OLS or by fixed 
effects estimation. An OLS estimator of β  in equation 1 is inconsistent, because the 
explanatory variable 1, −tiyβ  is positively correlated with the error term due to the 
presence of individual effects. A fixed effects estimation does not have this inconsistency 
because the equation is transformed to remove the individual effect, as in equation 2.
( ) ( ) (2).                                               1,2,1,1, −−−− −+−=− tiittititiit yyyy εεβ
However, this has the different problem of correlation between the transformed lagged 
dependent variable and transformed error term. The overall impact of the correlations is 
negative, and is the well-known Nickell (1981) bias. Bond (2002), in a paper that was 
very informative for the work of this section, states that these biases provide an informal 
test for an estimator of the lagged dependent variable. He suggests that the estimated 
coefficient should be bounded below by the outcome from OLS (which gives the 
maximum upwards bias) but above by the fixed effects estimate (which gives the 
maximum downwards bias). 
Due to  these problems,  the standard approach is  to  find a  suitable  instrument  that  is 
correlated  with  the  potentially  endogenous  variable  (the  more  highly the  better),  but 
uncorrelated  with  εit.  Because  instrumentation  is  not  confined  to  one  instrument  per 
parameter  to  be  estimated,  the  possibility  exists  of  defining  more  than  one  moment 
condition  per  parameter  to  be estimated.  It  is  this  possibility that  is  exploited  in  the 
General Method of Moments (GMM) estimation of dynamic panel models, first proposed 
by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988). The two models popularly implemented are the “difference” 
GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and the “system” GMM estimator (Arellano 
and Bover 1995). Greene (2002, p.308) explains that suitable instruments fulfilling the 
criteria mentioned above come from within the dataset: the lagged difference (yit-2  – yit-
3) ;and the lagged level  yit-2.  Both of these should satisfy the two conditions for valid 
instruments, since they are likely to be highly correlated with ( 2,1, −− − titi yy ) but not be 
correlated with
( )1, −− tiit εε . It is this easy availability of such “internal” instruments (i.e., 
from  within  the  dataset)  that  the  GMM  estimators  exploit.  The  “difference”  GMM 
estimator follows the Arellano and Bond (1991) data transformation, where  differences  
are instrumented by levels. The “system” GMM estimator adds to this one extra layer of 
instrumentation where the original levels are instrumented with differences.
These estimators, unlike OLS and conventional FE and RE estimation, do not require 
distributional  assumptions,  like  normality,  and  can  allow  for  heteroscedasticity  of 
unknown form (Verbeek, 2000, pp. 143 and 331; Greene, 2002, pp.201, 525 and 523). A 
more extensive discussion of these methods is beyond the scope of this thesis, but the 
references provided above and papers by Roodman (e.g. 2006, 2007, and 2009) are very 
informative.8 A  further  advantage  of  GMM  estimation  and  the  use  of  ‘internal’ 
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instruments is that applied researchers can select which variables are endogenous and 
which  are  exogenous.  Here we assume that,  regarding life  satisfaction,  everything is 
potentially endogenous with the exception of the age, region and wave dummies. This is 
discussed below.
As a consequence of the lagged dependent variable being estimated (and the internal 
instruments used), the number of observations will shrink somewhat because two 
consecutive years are needed. In 2001, i.e. wave 11 of the BHPS, the life satisfaction 
question was not asked which will mean two years of no data because of the missing lags. 
Given the necessity of (a minimum of) two consecutive years, the number of observations 
from dynamic estimates will be smaller than the observations used in the static analysis 
of section 3
Before estimating any dynamic panel model there are two important considerations. 
Firstly, are the regressors potentially endogenous or strictly exogenous? And secondly, 
how many instruments to use? With happiness equations many of the regressors are 
potentially endogenous – does marriage, for example, make someone happy or are happy 
people more likely to get married  (or are both determined by underlying but omitted 
variables) – and with this in mind, all of the controls apart from age and the wave and 
region dummies are treated as potentially endogenous. There is no perfect number of 
instruments to use, and a general rule is the more the better unless they start becoming 
too weak. However, there are standard diagnostic tests which can offer guidance with 
 The Roodman papers are particularly useful for applied researchers because they explains how to 
use the Stata software programme, xtabond2, that he created to implement the GMM dynamic estimators.
respect to the choice of instruments, and the discussion now turns to this aspect of 
dynamic estimation.
The “system” GMM estimation was undertaken twice, with the difference between the 
two being only the number of internal instruments the system uses (based on lag length 
choice), the minimum first and then the default maximum. In both cases the diagnostics 
indicate that first order autocorrelation is present (p=0.000 for the null of no first-order 
serial correlation, for both estimates), but second order is not (p=0.925 and p=0.623, for 
the minimum and default choice of instrumentation). This is expected (and necessary): 
the difference of lags and the difference of levels are correlated (first order), However, 
the second differences are not and thus valid for instrumentation. Also the various tests of 
the  instruments  indicate  that  they  are  suitable  in  each  case  –  the  null  hypothesis  of 
exogenous instruments (what  we want)  cannot be rejected.  The Hansen (1982) test  J 
statistic9 of all overidentifying restrictions, with a p-value of approximately 0.37 (for both 
estimates),  does  not  reject  the  null  of  instrument  validity  indicating  an  almost  forty 
percent chance of a type one error if the null is rejected. This is higher than Roodman’s 
recommended threshold of a p-value of 0.25 where he (2007, p.10) warns that researchers 
should not view a value above a conventional significance level of 0.05 of 0.10 
with complacency. Even leaving aside the potential weakness of the test, those 
thresholds  are  conservative  when  trying  to  decide  on  the  significance  of  a 
coefficient  estimate,  but  they  are  liberal  when  trying  to  rule  out  correlation 
between instruments and the error term. A p value as high as, say, 0.25 should be 
viewed with concern.  Taken at  face value, it  means that if  the specification is 
valid, the odds are less than 1 in 4 that one would observe a J statistic so large. 
9
This has the advantage over the Sargan J test because it works in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. Indeed, if the errors are believed to be homoscedastic then the Hansen test is the same as 
the Sargan test.
Thus, for both estimations, we have the necessary second-order serial correlation and the 
instrumentation is valid. Satisfactory diagnostics means we can now turn to the actual 
results, though the interpretation of the coefficients is not the same as that for standard FE 
analysis:
Adding dynamics to a model … creates a major change in the interpretation of the 
equation. Without the lagged variable, the “independent variables” represent the 
full  set  of  information  that  produce  observed  outcome  yit.  With  the  lagged 
variable, we now have in the equation the entire history of the right-hand-side 
variables,  so that any measured influence is conditional on this history; in this 
case, any impact of (the independent variables)  xit represents the effect of  new 
information. (Greene, 2008, p.468)
This quote is instructive for the discussion which follows table 3 below, and also 
regarding the decision as to whether to model the omitted dynamics more generally. A 
note on the internal instruments helps to explain the difference between the columns in 
the table. The problem of ‘too many instruments’, as identified by Roodman, is 
particularly problematic in small samples, but is less likely to be a problem here given 
that we are dealing with more than 13,000 observations. However, there is not yet any 
known way of choosing the instrument set beyond trial and error. Here we present the 
results from “system” GMM estimation with the minimum number of instruments 
(column 1), and the maximum default instrumentation (column 2), and this is the only 
difference between the estimations generating the results in the two columns.
Table 3 life satisfaction of young British people, assessed via dynamic analysis.
 (1) (2)
Life Satisfaction Life Satisfaction
Number of instruments 229 747
   
Lagged Life Satisfaction 0.10*** 0.08***
(0.021) (0.019)
Income -0.07 0.01
(0.081) (0.060)
Self-employed -0.15 -0.10
(0.210) (0.185)
Unemployed 0.09 -0.22
(0.356) (0.216)
Other Labour Force Status 0.08 0.05
(0.159) (0.128)
Married 0.48*** 0.46***
(0.070) (0.063)
Separated -0.33 -0.25
(0.393) (0.287)
Divorced 0.19 0.25
(0.245) (0.207)
Widowed -0.40 -2.02***
(2.853) (0.626)
Education: High -0.02 -0.12
(0.272) (0.219)
Education: Medium -0.20 -0.22
(0.337) (0.263)
Health: Excellent 1.07*** 0.99***
(0.248) (0.157)
Health: Good 0.41* 0.50***
(0.210) (0.113)
age2324 -0.01 -0.01
(0.034) (0.032)
age2526 -0.05 -0.06
(0.041) (0.038)
age2729 -0.12*** -0.14***
(0.047) (0.044)
Wave Dummies Yes Yes
Region Dummies Yes Yes
Constant 4.30*** 4.41***
(0.346) (0.279)
Observations 13,688 13,688
Number of pid 4,823 4,823
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A substantial discussion will follow regarding the lagged dependent variable, its result, 
and the interpretation of that result, but we note here that it is small and positive 
(approximately 0.1) and statistically significant. For the estimation with minimum 
instrumentation, the other statistically significant influences on life satisfaction are 
marriage and health that is either self-reported as excellent or good (with good having a 
p-value of 0.052). For the choice of default instrumentation, the results are the same 
(though good health is now statistically significant at or below the 1% level) with the 
addition of a negative impact from being a widow. As Greene reminds us, the 
interpretation of these coefficients is that they represent the effect of new information, 
whereas the lagged dependent variable reflects the influence of the past. Two changes 
from the static results of section 3 stand out. Both income and unemployment, when 
estimated in a dynamic model and treated as endogenous, are not significantly different 
from zero in their association with life satisfaction. Using GMM methods we can 
discover whether the reason for this is the dynamic estimation or treating the variables as 
endogenous.10 Further estimations reveal that the reason for this loss of significance is not 
due to the move to dynamic analysis, but because we have chosen to treat both income 
and unemployment as endogenous. The results from a dynamic estimate treating these 
two variables as exogenous are presented below in table 4, and a discussion follows.
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An advantage of GMM estimation when compared to FE is that applied researchers can, even in a 
static context, instrument for potentially endogenous variables. 
Table 4 life satisfaction of young British people, assessed via dynamic analysis (income 
and unemployment treated as exogenous)
 (1) (2)
Life Satisfaction Life Satisfaction
Number of instruments 229 747
   
Lagged Life Satisfaction 0.10*** 0.08***
(0.021) (0.019)
Income 0.08** 0.08***
(0.033) (0.027)
Self-employed -0.18 -0.08
(0.219) (0.171)
Unemployed -0.32*** -0.36***
(0.092) (0.083)
Other Labour Force Status 0.09 0.07
(0.166) (0.129)
Married 0.43*** 0.45***
(0.069) (0.064)
Separated -0.20 -0.32
(0.373) (0.282)
Divorced 0.17 0.26
(0.251) (0.203)
Widowed -1.00 -1.94***
(2.697) (0.743)
Education: High 0.06 -0.11
(0.274) (0.226)
Education: Medium -0.04 -0.22
(0.340) (0.277)
Health: Excellent 1.21*** 1.06***
(0.257) (0.107)
Health: Good 0.47** 0.54***
(0.229) (0.109)
age2324 -0.04 -0.03
(0.032) (0.031)
age2526 -0.09*** -0.08**
(0.036) (0.035)
age2729 -0.19*** -0.17***
(0.041) (0.040)
Wave Dummies Yes Yes
Region Dummies Yes Yes
Constant 3.99*** 4.30***
(0.330) (0.273)
Observations 13,688 13,688
Number of pid 4,823 4,823
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
These results show that, when treated as exogenous, the effect of the income of British 
individuals in their twenties on self-reported life satisfaction is positive and significant, 
whilst that of unemployment is negative and significant. One question, therefore, is what 
our assumptions should be regarding the exogeneity or endogeneity of these variables. 
The economic literature has started to explore the notion that income may promote 
happiness, but happiness may also lead to increases in income or, as the title of one 
article has it, happiness may ‘pay’  (Powdthavee 2009; De Neue and Oswald 2012) but 
has not really addressed whether unemployment and life satisfaction are endogenous.11 If 
they are connected by an omitted but time invariant factor, then FE analysis (though 
static) can be said to account for it. One possibility for an omitted variable might be 
depression, but an argument could be that this is itself indicated by low life satisfaction 
scores. If the endogeneity is caused by simultaneity rather than an omitted variable then 
static FE methods cannot account for this. It is clear that happiness work must carefully 
consider the potential relationships between the independent variables and life 
satisfaction. GMM methods can allow for both dynamic estimation and also potentially 
11
It is worth noting that other possibilities were investigated. Interacting, variously, age, income, and 
gender with unemployment changes neither the result for unemployment, not the results for the other 
coefficients. Gender is not reported here because the aim of these regressions is to be as close to the 
estimation to the static FE as possible (where gender cannot be accounted for). However, running these 
regressions separately for each gender does not change the outcome nor does the inclusion of a gender 
dummy variable. Further checks were made with the 50s age range, and these also support the results of 
this paper.
endogenous relationships, and should be more routinely considered in the happiness 
empirical literature. 
The coefficient on lagged happiness in these dynamic estimations is itself interesting and 
as Greene informs us (see the quote just above table 3), this coefficient represents the 
‘entire history of the model’ i.e. the past history of the process that generates current 
levels of happiness. This coefficient is positive, suggesting a persistence or inertia effect 
from previous happiness: lagged happiness being positively associated with current 
happiness. That the coefficient is small (around 0.1) means that this influence of the past 
is minor, which demonstrates that what is (largely) important for the determination of 
current happiness are current circumstances and events. In all cases, dynamic GMM 
estimation for life satisfaction also passes Bond’s (2002) informal test for a good 
estimator (mentioned above): the coefficient of 0.1 is lower than that obtained by OLS 
(which is biased upwards) and higher than that obtained by fixed effects (which is biased 
downwards). We return to this discussion of the approximate 0.1 coefficient on lagged 
life satisfaction, after discussing a different conjecture in the literature.
Another possible hypothesis has been put forward for the coefficient on lagged happiness. 
Bottan and Perez-Truglia (2010) assert that past happiness should be negatively 
correlated with current happiness supporting their notion of what they call general 
habituation (in contrast to specific habituation which is getting used to a single event like, 
for example, marriage or a pay rise). Because specific habituation occurs (see section 2 
above), they argue that general habituation should occur: we get to adapt to marriage and 
divorce (see section 2) so perhaps we adapt to happiness overall (an argument that 
ignores events like unemployment which people do not appear to adapt to (Clark et al. 
2008)). In “the very first paper to address [this] empirically” Bottan and Perez-Truglia 
(2010, p.2) argue for general adaptation in their opening paragraph with this rationale (the 
oft-found adaptation in the literature to specific incidents means that there is a general 
adaptation effect too). In a later version of this paper, in support of general adaptation 
they refer to “what we might recognise as the evolutionary origins of hedonic adaptation. 
The basic intuition is that positive and negative hedonic states are costly from a fitness 
perspective: e.g. generating feelings is a waste of energy for the brain. In order to 
minimise those fitness costs, humans have adapted with hedonic states that quickly return 
to ‘normal levels’” (Bottan and Perez-Truglia 2011, p.225). A little later on the same page 
they expand on this idea and suggest that “the reward centers in the brain may work as a 
spring: i.e. as soon as an individual excites some area in the brain, the corresponding 
reward system will automatically start pushing in the opposite direction”. Their empirical 
results, based on panel data from Britain (the BHPS), Germany (the GSOEP), Japan (the 
Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers) and Switzerland (the Swiss Household Panel) 
suggest that persistence (or inertia) exists – the sign on the coefficient for lagged 
happiness is positive and significant and not negative (as they expect) – and that this, they 
suggest, presents a ‘puzzle’. Another, and more likely, interpretation may be that their 
initial speculation is wrong, and that general adaptation is not found. They try many 
different specifications and consistently find a small, but positive impact of lagged 
happiness on current happiness. The empirical results above, tables 3 and 4, confirm their 
findings of no general habituation, but instead indicate that there is some happiness 
‘carry-over’ from the previous period.12
Returning to our results, we investigate further this small persistence effect. Robustness 
checks follow supporting this finding of a low level of persistence from past happiness, 
but before then, and for clarity, it should be emphasised that using the term persistence 
does not necessarily indicate a fixed effect. The lagged dependent variable aggregates all 
previous influences, both observed and unobserved. Because these change, so does the 
value of the lagged dependent variable. Though we have a fairly persistent coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable, it is not a fixed effect and hence not something that would 
be captured by fixed effects estimation. A little algebra demonstrates that this is the case, 
which just expands the lagged dependent variable to demonstrate that it contains more 
than just the fixed effect. In equation 3 LSit  is the life satisfaction of individual i in year t, 
βXit is an independent variable and ϵ it  is the usual error term. Starting with our 
simplified specification in equation 5.3, we repeatedly substitute for the lagged dependent 
variable. 
Substitute for LSit-1 in (5.3):
LS it=α̂ LS it−1+ β̂ xit+ϵit (3)
LS it−1=α̂ LS it−2+ β̂ xit −1+ϵ it−1 (4)
Substitute (5.4) into (3)
LS it=α̂ ( α̂ LS it−2+ β̂ x it−1+ϵit −1)+ β̂ xit+ϵ it (5)
12
This paper is worrying for other reasons than the authors’ refusal to accept what the empirical 
results tell them. They do not seem to understand the dynamic models they employ, neither appearing to 
understand the Sargan test (reporting when they reject the null of instrument validity only, without further 
comment) nor the meaning of the lagged dependent variable.
Substitute for LS it −2  in (3):
LS it −2=α̂ LS it−3+ β̂ xit −2+ϵ it−2                 (6)
Substitute (6) into (5)
LS it=α̂ (α̂ [ α̂ LS it−3+ β̂ x it−2+ϵ it−2]+ β̂ x it−1+ϵ it−1)+ β̂ xit+ϵit (7)
Gather terms          
LS it=α̂
3 LS it−3+α̂
2 β̂ x it−2+α̂ β̂ xit−1+ β̂ x it
+α̂2 ϵ it−2+α̂ ϵ it−1+ϵ it (7 ')
Going back further than four lags introduces more past values and more idiosyncratic 
error terms too. By repeated substitution, we demonstrate that through the lagged 
dependent variable dynamic specifications contain the entire history of the independent 
variable(S). Thus we cannot assume that the lagged dependent variable represents any 
kind of fixed effect. We can only say that this variable tells us the influence of the past, 
and the results above suggest that there is an overhang from the past. 
To check whether this is just an artefact of this particular sample a comparison was made 
with individuals in their 50s over the same time period, and again lagged happiness is 
statistically significant and positively associated with current happiness. This is the case 
with both minimum and default instrumentation, and the diagnostics are similar to those 
for the twenties age range, statistically supporting both specifications. Taken together it 
seems that a small amount of happiness is persistent over time, and that this persistence is 
not age dependent (approximately  0.09 for the 20s, 0.08 for the 50s). However, the 
slightly lower coefficient regarding the influence of past happiness may be consistent 
with Carstensen’s theory (mentioned in section 2) where older people are said to feel 
more connection to the present. The coefficient on lagged happiness for individuals aged 
between 15 and 60 is around 0.095, offering yet more support for results found for the 
20s and 50s individually. 
A further robustness check involves using the alternative to the life satisfaction one-item 
measure, the General Health Questionnaire. Frequently used as a proxy for psychological 
well-being, it is available in every wave of the BHPS thus providing 17 waves of data, 
and avoiding the problem presented by the life satisfaction question not being asked in 
the middle of the data set. The table below reports the coefficient on the lag of both 
Caseness and Likert GHQ, when they have, respectively been used as a ‘happiness’ 
proxy, for the twenties.
Table 5 How GHQ well-being is influenced by its lag, twenties age range
Minimum 
instruments
with collapse
(58)
Minimum 
instruments 
(397)
Maximum 
instruments
(1268)
Sample size
Caseness 0.081*** 0.073*** 0.047***  Obs = 17537
Avg obs/group = 3.3Likert 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.060***
Table 5: How GHQ well-being is influenced by its lag, fifties age range
Minimum 
instruments
with collapse
(60)
Minimum 
instruments 
(448)
Maximum 
instruments
(1504)
Sample size
Caseness 0.102*** 0.132*** 0.121***  Obs = 13126
Avg obs/group = 4.04Likert 0.060*** 0.087*** 0.108***
Caseness for the whole age range using minimum instrumentation with ‘collapse’13 – the 
only one Stata could calculate in less than twenty four hours – gives the average impact 
of lagged satisfaction as 0.084. This is also highly significant, and the diagnostics are, 
like all of the others above, as expected offering further support for the finding of a small 
but persistent effect of past happiness on current happiness. Or, from another angle, that 
current happiness is largely determined by current events. Not displayed here due to 
space considerations, but similar life satisfaction estimates with the German SOEP to 
those undertaken here with the BHPS were made and an approximate 0.1 result is found 
for the coefficient on lagged happiness. A result that is similarly statistically significant at 
the 1% level.
One further advantage of dynamic panel analysis is the ability to separately quantify the 
short-run impact and the long-run effect of various independent variables. The short-run 
impacts are given by the estimations above, and the long-run effects are calculated by 
dividing these short-run coefficients by 1 minus the coefficient on lagged happiness. In 
the case of lagged happiness, this means, in effect dividing each coefficient by 
approximately 0.9. Because the coefficient on lagged happiness is positive but small, this 
means that the LR effects (which include the short-run impact) are only slightly higher 
than the short-run impact. This seems reasonable: the happiness associated with being 
married in one particular year has very little carryover to long-run happiness. (This, for 
13
 As the Stata help file for xtabond2 declares, the collapse command greatly 
curtails the width of the instrument matrix and helps keep the matrix within Stata’s size 
limit. It does this by specifying that xtabond2 should create one instrument for each 
variable and lag distance, rather than one for each time period, variable, and lag distance.
example, is unlike increased spending on schools or hospitals and its subsequent impact 
on a measure of performance.) The results are not reported here because they are not 
qualitatively different from the short-run impacts estimated in tables 3 and 4. In other 
areas, where the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is higher, the long-run 
impacts can be quite different from the short-run impact, both in terms of size but also 
significance. Happiness, with its low level of persistence, is likely to be a special case.
One more reason for happiness being a special case is with respect to the argument that 
dynamics should be modelled as a matter of course. This argument is made by Bond 
(2002) who argues that “even when coefficients on lagged dependent variables are not of 
direct interest, allowing for dynamics in the underlying process may be crucial for 
recovering consistent estimates of other parameters” (p.1; see also p.20). We suggest that 
for happiness estimates (because of the low influence of the past), where the variables of 
interest are historic rather than current, the impact will be caught in the ‘black box’ of the 
lagged dependent variable, and thus dynamic estimation may not be particularly 
informative.14 Yet Bond’s general advice is helpful.   If serial correlation is found in the 
idiosyncratic error term, then estimating happiness equations with dynamics should be 
considered on an investigation by investigation basis. 
5 Concluding remarks
14
 In this case, to account for the omitted dynamics one can model them in the residual as long as the 
common factor restrictions hold. For a more detailed discussion, and an example using happiness and 
education see Piper (2012).
The analysis of this paper both supports and extends recent research. The focus on the 
twenties is novel, and many justifications both theoretical and methodological have been 
provided above for the concentration on both a specific age range and this particular 
range. The static estimations provide support for previous studies, with the qualitative 
impact on happiness of various controls being similar to that found in many of the studies 
discussed throughout the paper. The underlying U-shape relationship between well-being 
and age is supported by the analysis here: happiness declines over the twenties, a result 
found by comparing the coefficients of the age dummies.
The diagnostic tests on the static estimations, reported in section 3, indicate the presence 
of omitted dynamics, and thus the analysis here extends previous work by estimating a 
dynamic panel model in section 4. The central finding is robust: a statistically significant 
positive coefficient for lagged happiness. There is a clear, if small (approximately 0.09), 
impact of past happiness on this year’s happiness. This finding suggests that there is an 
element of persistence in happiness, at least for UK data. This is the case for those in their 
20s, 50s, and over the whole of the lifecycle. This finding is also robust to an alternative 
measure of well-being, the General Health Questionnaire. Estimates with the German 
SOEP also demonstrate a similar effect. Furthermore, another study (Bottan and Perez-
Truglia 2011) finds the same result in Germany, Japan, and Switzerland, though as 
discussed above these authors do not seem to know what it means or implies for 
happiness. Rather than being a ‘puzzle’, this result should perhaps be unsurprising: most 
of what influences current happiness appears to be contemporaneous. 
This finding of a robust positive coefficient for the impact of lagged happiness on current 
happiness suggests that the static models of the previous empirical literature are 
misspecified, potentially invalidating their results. However the small coefficient on 
lagged happiness is indicative of current happiness being largely due to current 
circumstances, which offers some support for the results found in the previous static 
literature. Indeed, dynamic estimations can offer a robustness check for static regressions. 
One further benefit of dynamic analysis is the ability to distinguish between short- and 
long-run effects, and for happiness regressions it confirms what seems reasonable: most 
of the effect comes from short-run effects (or the current circumstances of the individual). 
Applied researchers can also decide whether to estimate variables as potentially 
endogenous or exogenous. The results above suggest that this choice is important, 
modelling income and unemployment as endogenous results in an influence on happiness 
that is not significantly different from zero. Much more research is necessary regarding 
the potential endogeneity of independent variables with respect to happiness and GMM 
estimation can help with such an investigation.
Dynamic analysis is unusual in this literature, but the analysis of this paper suggests that 
consideration of dynamic methods should become the default position. There are clear 
dynamic effects in satisfaction estimations and a failure to model these can, even when 
the lagged dependent variable is not of interest (as Bond, 2002, highlights), lead to 
inconsistent estimates of the other parameters. 
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